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Africa and the Green Revolution
A Global Historical Perspective
Esteemed Rector Magnificus, dear colleagues, family, friends, ladies and gentlemen,
After several centuries of rising global inequality during the so-called era of the Great 
Divergence, our generation is witnessing a new epoch in world history, one of rapid 
economic convergence1. Emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey 
are reconfiguring the gravity centers of the global economy with astonishing speed. 
Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region torn apart by decades of civil war and economic 
crises, hopeful signs of growing prosperity have emerged in recent years (Radelet 
2010, Young 2012). It remains to be seen, however, to which extent Africa’s current 
growth revival builds on a profound transformation of the social, political and 
economic fabric. Is the region not just experiencing the inevitable recovery from an 
equally inevitable post-colonial collapse? And what sets this wave of growth apart 
from recurring African cycles of natural resource booms and busts, driven by volatile 
world market prices for tropical cash crops and mineral resources?
The historical analogy that shores up the argument I will develop today is that no 
civilization in the past has flourished for long, without an effective strategy to gather, 
produce or trade food in sufficient quantity and quality. Food surpluses were needed 
to raise armies, build cities and fill treasuries. In his monumental Agrarian History of 
Western-Europe Slicher van Bath – the first chair of Rural History in Wageningen and 
founding father of the ‘New Economic History’ in the Netherlands – has demon-
strated that the affluence we enjoy at present, is rooted in millennia of agrarian change 
(Slicher van Bath 1963). In a similar vein, Bieleman’s analysis of Five Centuries of Dutch 
Farming shows in detail how the rise of the Dutch urban economy in early modern 
times was rooted in a fertile exchange between city and countryside (Bieleman 2010).
The analogy does not stop here. Although the Asian renaissance of the late 20th 
century has primarily been associated with rapid industrialization, it has been 
preceded by impressive gains in agricultural output and productivity (World Bank
1  I am grateful to Katharine Frederick and Sanne Mirck for their assistance in preparing this lecture.
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1993, Kohli 2004, Otsuka et al. 2009, Henley 2012). In the Philippines, where the 
famous International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) was established in 1960, rice
yields doubled in no time. In Indonesia, the Suharto regime accomplished what the 
Dutch had failed to do before, namely, to turn the country from a net importer of rice 
into a net exporter in just one decade after the food crisis of the early 1970s (Djurfeldt 
and Jirström 2005). And India, one of the most famine-prone regions of the world 
for centuries, managed to avert the Malthusian doom scenarios painted by many a 
respected scientist in the late 1960s (Ehrlich 1968, Myrdal 1968). In Latin America 
productivity increases were impressive as well. In Mexico wheat yields started to rise 
at exponential rates in the 1950s. In Brazil maize output per hectare has quadrupled 
since the early 1960s (see figure 1).
Figure 1. The per capita production of food in Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1961-2011 
at national level for selected countries between 1961 and 2008. Source: FAOSTAT 2013.
The timing of the ‘Green Revolution’ could hardly have been better. It occurred 
exactly in the period when world population growth reached its peak. Except for 
Sub-Saharan Africa2. In Africa, food production did not keep pace with population 
growth. Certainly, agricultural production rose in absolute terms, but mainly because 
growing numbers of smallholders brought more land under cultivation (Larson and 
Otsuka 2012a, v; Mugera and Ojede 2013). In the majority of African countries the
2 I will also use the shorter term ‘Africa’ as a substitute for ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ hereafter.
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per capita production of food declined from the 1960s through the 1990s. According 
to FAO statistics, even today some 30 out of 53 African countries produce less food 
per head of the population than they did in the early 1960s (FAOSTAT). Whereas 
historically food shortages had been of an incidental nature, caused by climate 
shocks, disease epidemics or military conflict, in the late 20th century they became 
the result of a structural mismatch between local demand and supply (Iliffe 1987). 
Large-scale famines, a typically Asian phenomenon until the 1960s, became 
increasingly associated with Africa (O’ Grada 2009, Devereux 2009).
The recent catastrophe in the Horn of Africa has revived the images of the horrible 
famine of the mid-1980s, which have left a deep imprint on my childhood recollec-
tions. If anything, it indicates that amidst the present optimism, African growth 
experiences remain highly differentiated. That structural food shortages have not led 
to a much higher incidence of famine owes much to modern means of transportation 
and communication, facilitating large scale food imports as well as improving the 
effectiveness of international food aid programs. In Ethiopia in the 1980s, as well as 
recently in Somalia, attempts to alleviate drought-induced harvest failures were 
frustrated by dirty wars, causing hundreds of thousands of excess deaths. More 
effective interventions of food aid avoided such dire consequences in countries like 
Niger and Malawi, which were also coping with serious food crises in the past 
decade (Reij and Smaling 2008). 
According to the UN, the world population will grow from roughly 7 billion at 
present to 10 billion at the end of this century. About 70% of the projected increase, 
that is 2.3 billion, is expected to occur in Sub-Saharan Africa alone (see figure 2). Yet, 
the challenge goes even beyond the need to improve food security in times of rapidly 
increasing demand. The challenge also involves the need to balance the growth of 
urban sectors with rising rural incomes (Haggblade and Hazell 2010). Since the 
majority of Africans is still employed in agriculture, improving rural living standards 
is the key to mitigate further increases in socio-economic inequality, the key to 
raising domestic consumer demand and, eventually, the key to strengthening the 
fiscal basis of African economies.
Fortunately, there is a renewed focus of national and international agencies on rural 
development in Africa. The World Bank, after a period of neglect during the struc-
tural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s (World Bank 2008; Larson and 
Otsuka 2013) now increasingly recognizes Africa’s economic, geographic and
institutional diversity3. Wageningen University is involved in this endeavor in 
3  The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), a joint initiative of the Rockefeller and the 
Gates Foundations, also specifically aims to promote tailor-made projects (AGRA 2013).
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Figure 2. Observed and expected population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1950-2100 
(billions of people). Source: UN World Population Database.
various ways as well, for instance, through research on new African rice varieties or 
research on the effectiveness of aid-sponsored agrarian development programs. In 
addition, there is an outspoken ambition, also within this university, to avoid the 
environmental costs of the original green revolution in terms of water and soil 
pollution, land erosion and loss of biodiversity. Indeed, the call for a ‘doubly green 
revolution’ stresses the need to combine agricultural productivity growth with more 
sustainable forms of natural resource management (Conway 1998).
But while embarking on renewed investment and research efforts, it is worthwhile 
to take the long-term picture into account. After all, why did Africa miss the green 
revolution in the first place? And what reasons do we have to think that this time is 
different? In the remainder of this lecture I hope to convince you that a global 
historical perspective offers some insights that deserve to be heard in the present 
debate on Africa’s growth revival.
The Green Revolution
‘Timing’ is a crucial aspect of revolutions. To understand what the green revolution 
exactly entailed, we need to understand why it occurred when it did. The standard 
tale portrays the green revolution as a technological breakthrough in the devel-
opment of new high-yielding varieties of cereal grains, especially wheat, rice and 
maize, between the early 1940s and the late 1970s (Estudillo and Otsuka 2012). 
Experiments with these new varieties started in Mexico in 1943 by the team of 
Norman Borlaug, an American agronomist who won the Nobel peace prize in 1970 
for his path-breaking research. These new varieties were designed to transform 
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increasing inputs of water and artificial fertilizer into a larger number of kernels 
per ear. Heavier ears were made to grow on shorter and stronger stems in order to 
prevent the plants from lodging. The cultivation of new varieties was complemented 
by an intensified use of machinery, irrigation, and a wide range of insecticides, 
pesticides and herbicides.
It is important to recognize, however, that most of the ‘technological’ ingredients of 
the green revolution had been in the delivery room of history for quite some time. 
The increased use of fertilizer had been part and parcel of expanding global trade in 
the 19th century, when large quantities of Peruvian guano and Chilean nitrates were 
shipped across the Atlantic and the Pacific to fertilize European and North American 
acres (Melillo 2012). The economic historians Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode (2010) 
have made a compelling case that most of the productivity gains in American 
agriculture during the 19th century stemmed from biological innovations in plant 
and animal disease control, including the experimentation with, and application of, 
cross-breeding techniques. In other words, the ‘green revolution’ was already gaining 
steam in the industrializing countries in the 19th century and I would argue that the 
real revolution was not so much a technological one, but rather the rapid diffusion
of useful scientific knowledge across large parts of the Southern hemisphere.
If we pursue this argument, the question of timing redirects attention to the role
of state policy in overcoming certain market imperfections. Asian governments 
channelled substantial public resources into the development of rural infrastructure 
and credit facilities. They subsidized and coordinated technical support to farmers.
They offered infant-industry protection to emerging fertilizer industries and, in some 
cases, Asian governments went as far as to distribute micro-packages of hybridized 
seed and fertilizer to encourage farmers to grow new cultivars (Jirström 2005). 
 
The political momentum that pushed Asian governments into such a pro-active role 
had been building up during the Cold War. The Americans, in particular, feared that 
the impoverished masses in Asia would act as a magnet to socialist propaganda. 
The term “Green Revolution” was introduced to contrast America’s foreign policy 
with the violence associated with Red guerilla movements4. “Green”, as opposed 
to “Red”, was the color of peace. Peaceful scientific progress was presented as the 
capitalist alternative to combat hunger, poverty and inequality (Cullather 2010). 
Leaders like Marcos, Suharto and Indira Ghandi came to see ‘rice, roads and schools’ 
as crucial components of their attempt to centralize power and raise popular support 
(Djurfeldt and Jirström 2005). 
4  USAID director William Gaud is credited with the invention of this term in 1968 (Cullather 2010, 7).
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So when it comes to explaining agrarian transitions, there are several perspectives 
one may take, varying from a strictly technological approach that emphasizes the 
specific opportunities and constraints of local ecologies, to a political economy 
approach that focuses on the incentive structures underlying specific forms of human 
cooperation, or lack thereof. These perspectives are not mutually exclusive, on the 
contrary. In African history they are deeply intertwined. 
Africa’s legacy of extensive agriculture
Modern genetic research suggests that our common ancestors originated in Africa 
and that they reached anatomical modernity some 200,000 years ago. However, 
although the homo sapiens had been around in Africa for perhaps twice as long as in 
the rest of the world, the first urban civilizations supported by sedentary agriculture 
emerged outside Africa. In fact, Africa has remained one of the least densely 
populated areas of the world until today, and it is only in the second half of the 20th 
century that it was home to one of the biggest population booms ever recorded in 
human history. Although the debate on the demographic impact of the African slave 
trades is still unsettled (Manning 2010), few scholars would dispute that Africa 
offered a comparatively inhospitable environment for sustaining large concentrations 
of people. Apart from the high incidence of tropical diseases such as malaria, there 
were a number of barriers to the development of sedentary agriculture.
To begin with, Africa is not very well endowed with navigable waterways. Anyone 
who has some affinity with Dutch economic history will recognize what this implies 
for the opportunities of commercial development. When excluding the Sahara and 
Kalahari deserts, where supporting large concentrations of people is impossible 
anyway, the lion’s share of Africa’s cultivable land lies in the tropics. Rain forests 
host a broad range of edible crops, but food cannot be stored for long in warm and 
moist climates. The possibilities for the refinement, processing and trading of food 
items were therefore more limited than in temperate climates. Tropical soils are 
fertile, but also quickly exhausted, favouring systems of extensive land use and 
day-to-day harvests of roots, tubers and starchy fruit, such as plantain, for immediate 
consumption, along with the production of cereal grains.
Livestock breeding broadens the opportunities to store wealth, mediate risks and 
raise land productivity in pre-industrial societies. However, the presence of the tsetse 
fly in the African tropical forest belt has rendered large tracts of cultivable land 
unsuitable to the development of mixed farming systems (Goody 1971, Alsan 2012). 
The tsetse fly is the principle biological vector of African trypanosomiasis, better 
known as sleeping sickness (see figure 3). Apart from threatening human lives, it kills 
cattle and horses. Tsetse has hampered the intensification and commercialisation of 
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African agriculture in several ways. It impeded the development of ox-plough 
cultivation, it reduced the animal manure available for soil regeneration, it limited 
sources of animal protein, and it impeded the use of cattle and horses for transpor-
tation purposes. Hence, whereas in Eurasia a considerable part of the energy 
required for soil preparation and transportation was supplied by animals, in tropical 
Africa the energy had to be supplied by scarce human labour. The hoe thus remained 
the principle tool for soil preparation and human porterage the principle method for 
moving goods over large distances.
 
Large parts of the African savannah outside the tsetse-infested forest zone cope with 
prolonged periods of drought. The highly erratic rainfall patterns caused by the 
Asian-Australian monsoon system, turn the cultivation decisions of many East 
African farmers into a repeated gamble (Nairobi 1979). Interestingly, there is 
archaeological evidence of various pockets of intensive agriculture in East Africa, 
none of which have withstood the test of time. Historians are unsure about the 
causes of their disappearance, but it seems likely that climate shocks have played an 
important role (Widgren and Sutton 2004). In the most arid parts of the West African 
Sahel and East African coastal regions, nomadic pastoralism has proven to be the 
only way to sustain a living.
Figure 3. Tsetse infested parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: Alsan 2012.5
5  Marcella Alsan kindly provided me with the map of African tsetse incidence. The map is based on 
original data from Ford and Katondo (1976).
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A map of current population densities reveals how environmental conditions have 
shaped human settlement patterns in African history. Large concentrations of people 
can be found along the river Nile in Egypt and the Niger river system in present-day 
Nigeria. Other spots of high concentration can be found in the African rift valley, 
stretching from Ethiopia in the North all the way South into the Shire highlands of 
present-day Malawi. This area contains fertile land at higher altitudes where tsetse 
flies and malaria mosquitos fail to thrive.
Environmental determinism?
We may safely conclude that the widespread practice of extensive agriculture did 
not create optimal conditions for the type of intensification that characterised the 
green revolution in Asia. However, before reading a strong version of environmental 
determinism into African history, I would like to put forward three arguments 
against over-simplifying conclusions. 
First, we should not dismiss African agriculture as a ‘primitive’ undertaking. Shifting 
cultivation was a logical response to long regeneration periods of tropical soils that 
were poorly understood by European colonizers, who often regarded this waste of 
land as a sign of laziness or African irrationality. If we dig deeper into the historical 
record of African agriculture, the terms ‘adaptive’ or ‘responsive’ offer a much more 
adequate conception of its long-term evolution. After all, maize and cassava, the two 
biggest staple crops of Sub-Saharan Africa, did not originate in the region, but were 
adopted from the New World (McCann 1995, Agboola 1979). The same goes for 
potatoes, beans, peanuts and a large range of cash-crops such as tobacco, cocoa, 
cotton, and rubber (Tosh 1980). In fact, there is little historical ground for the idea 
that African farmers fail to see the potential of new crops or new crop varieties. There 
is a much better case to make that seemingly conservative cultivation decisions 
are guided by deep-seated strategies of risk-minimization, rather than income-
maximization (Seavoy 1989). 
Second, we should not conclude without further empirical investigation, that 
extensive agriculture left the average African subsistence farmer worse off than his 
counterparts elsewhere in the world6. Recent research into historical African living 
standards, the focal point of my ERC and VIDI research projects, suggests that 
during the colonial era nutritional conditions have been considerably better in West 
Africa than they were in Eastern and Southern Asia. And there are reasons to believe 
that this also holds for earlier periods. Yes, there existed competition over scarce 
6  See for expressions of what may be called “the persistent poverty view” Bloom and Sachs (1998, 207) 
or Allen (2011, 91). See for a response to this, Frankema and Waijenburg (2012, 897-9). 
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water resources and high-value land, which also played out in violent confrontations, 
but such conflicts were fought out in the context of an open land frontier where 
Malthusian pressures were largely absent. 
The distinguished British historian Tony Hopkins recently noted that according to 
dependency theorists life in the African colonies was “nasty, British and short”7. A 
new generation of historians, and I count myself among them, is trying to break out 
of the ideological chains of neo-Marxist history, and the Eurocentric explanations of 
African history it has forged, by simply acknowledging that the experiences of the 
Kuba in the Congo Free State during the rubber terror in the 1890s contrasted sharply 
with those of the Asante cocoa farmers in the Gold Coast during the 1920s 
(Hochschild 1999, Austin 2005, Vansina 2010). The research of Alexander Moradi and 
others points out that, if anything, average human stature rose during the colonial 
era (Moradi 2009; 2012; Austin et al. 2012). In several studies conducted together with 
Marlous van Waijenburg we document a rise in urban real wages starting in the 
1880s and continuing until the late 1960s (Frankema and van Waijenburg 2012, 
2013b). These welfare gains were more impressive in some places than in others and 
much research remains to be done in documenting and explaining these varying 
trajectories of welfare development (see figure 4).
Figure 4. Real wages of urban unskilled workers in Calcutta, New Delhi and Accra, 1870-2000  
(1 = subsistence level). Source: Frankema and van Waijenburg 2013b.
7  Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972) is the classic study, but much of what has 
been written between the 1970s and 2000s contains traces of dependency theory. See also Gareth 
Austin’s critique (2008) of Acemoglu et al. (2002).
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However, in anticipation of a better empirical foundation I remain sympathetic to 
John Iliffe’s qualification of historical African poverty as “land-rich poverty” (Iliffe 
1987). African poverty was rooted in a high exposure to tropical diseases and 
pre-mature death, but those who survived had access to a comparatively rich 
nutritional environment. African cattle herders, who had access to animal protein 
and dairy in exceptional quantities, were exceptionally tall for pre-industrial 
standards (Moradi 2012). Yet, the rinderpest epidemic that swept across East and 
Southern Africa in the 1890s killed approximately 90% of all cattle. Pastoral groups 
such as the Masai in Kenya, who were generally regarded as a healthy and wealthy 
tribe, starved to death in large numbers along with their animals (Mack 1970). 
But the most important argument against environmental determinism is the 
enormous potential of industrial technology and mechanical power that has become 
available in the past two centuries. Railways have cut back transportation costs. 
Artificial fertilizers can compensate for a lack of animal manure, tractors for a lack 
of animal draft power. There has also become available a broad range of new crop 
varieties that are specifically tailored to local African ecologies. Examples of 
technological innovation and knowledge improvements can be discussed at length, 
but the argument can also be framed into a more fundamental question: if the 
advances in modern medical technology and knowledge have allowed the African 
population to quadruple since 1950, why then would similar gains be inconceivable 
in African agriculture? 
African state formation in retrospective
Some studies suggest that the 11% food shortfall in Niger in 2005 could have been 
prevented by a simple program of distributing micro-doses of fertilizer to farmers 
and that such a program, even apart from the long-term knowledge spill-overs, 
would have cost only a quarter of the actual incurred emergency aid expenses (Reij 
and Smaling 2008, 413). If we accept that states have played a critical role in the 
spread of the green revolution in Asia, namely by addressing a number of market 
failures in the supply of rural infrastructure, credit facilities, education and access to 
intermediate inputs, we should also pay some attention to the historical features of 
African state formation. 
Early independent African states were fiscally underdeveloped, their bureaucracies 
were understaffed and undereducated, and there was a widespread incapacity to 
support economic policy-making with reliable statistical information (Frankema 
2012; 2013, Frankema and Jerven 2013). State policies designed to serve ‘national 
interests’ were paralyzed by a mosaic of ethnic, religious and tribal identities. If early 
independent African states were able to secure a monopoly on the use of violence in 
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the first place, it tended to be an unstable monopoly at best. Obafemi Awolowo, one 
of the founding fathers of independent Nigeria, put it as follows: “Nigeria is not a 
nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same 
sense as there are ‘English’, ‘Welsh’ or ‘French’.” (Awolowo 1947, 47)8. 
It has become a commonplace to argue that the creation of ‘states without nations’ 
was among the worst long-term legacies of European colonial rule in Africa, and 
I fully subscribe to this point. Few people realize, however, that the effective 
broadcasting of power by colonial governments was complicated by similar 
conditions that had hampered state centralisation in pre-colonial times. The crux of 
the problem was how to integrate relatively isolated and mobile groups of people, 
scattered across vast rural hinterlands, into the structures of a central state 
administration? In a context of shifting cultivation and nomadic pastoralism it is 
virtually impossible, and prohibitively expensive, to impose taxes on land or 
agricultural output. African state development was thus bound to the extraction of 
rents from trade and human captives. However, for the maintenance of courts, 
bureaucracies and armies, tax revenues from sedentary agriculture were far more 
stable. Slave raiding, in particular, created a highly adverse dynamic of violence, 
fugitive conduct and counter-insurgencies (Inikori 2013). 
Since control over people, rather than land, was key to achieving political ambitions, 
there were little incentives to formalize institutions for land tenure. The imposition of 
the European state concept in Africa, in which delineated territorial borders were a 
central part of the political logic, thus caused a rupture in the historical evolution of 
the African state (Herbst 2000). Yet, colonial borders were primarily designed to 
prevent intra-European conflicts on African soil, without having to overstretch 
limited government resources to actually control these territories. Frederick Cooper 
(2002) aptly depicted these colonial constructs as ‘gatekeeper states’.
 
Colonial arrangements with respect to land tenure differed widely. In the settler 
colonies of Southern and Eastern Africa, land was alienated at a considerable scale to 
facilitate the settlement of European farmers. In Central Africa large tracts of land 
were given in concession to private companies and missionaries. In parts of West 
Africa, however, European land ownership was discouraged or even prohibited 
(Amin 1972). Although the colonial state managed to extract some revenue from land 
grants, it primarily relied on a combination of trade, hut and head taxes (Frankema 
2010; 2011). These tax revenues were re-invested in the exploitation of mines and the 
facilitation of cash-crop exports. The improvement of subsistence agriculture was 
8 Quote obtained from Nugent 2012, 91 . 
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given no priority, and in some cases also suffered from the labor that was withdrawn 
from it to spur the more profitable sectors of the colonial economy. Yet, in many 
landlocked regions colonial tax revenues remained insufficient to finance even the 
lightest skeleton of a state administration. To accommodate this problem, the French 
created large federations in West and Equatorial Africa to redistribute revenues from 
the richer coastal colonies such as Gabon, Senegal and Dahomey towards the poor 
periphery consisting of present-day countries like Niger, Chad and the Central 
African Republic (Frankema and van Waijenburg 2013a).
Environmental constraints to state formation also show up in the history of African 
warfare (Reid 2012). Since the use of horses was essential to military operations in the 
open savannah lands, but useless in the tsetse-infested forest zone, it proved difficult 
to integrate both areas into an overarching state structure. The large Islamic states 
that emerged in the West African Sudan, such as the medieval and early-modern 
empires of Mali and Songhai, were kept together by armies of horseback warriors 
that were able to cover large distances. The political challenge of these empires was 
to keep the military elite, who had made significant investments in their equipment, 
united and prevent disintegration by establishing a monopoly on the Trans-Saharan 
trade in horses (Reid 2012, Goody 1971). In the forest zone the reach of foot soldier 
armies was considerably smaller. The slave states that arose along the West African 
coast, such as Dahomey, Asante and Oyo, were more compact and often incorporated 
women and children in their armies for logistic purposes (Reid 2012). For these 
coastal states it was crucial to maintain their first-mover advantage in the African-
European trade of slaves for guns (Fage 1969, Whatley 2013). This was an effective 
strategy for as long as the Atlantic slave trade continued, but in the 19th century, 
when British abolition efforts took effect, these states were forced to reinvent 
themselves. 
 
This is not to suggest that the process of African state formation was caged in an iron 
law of population scarcity and population mobility. The Sokoto caliphate in Northern 
Nigeria actively promoted the construction of ribats, small fortified towns that 
provided a basic level of security, schooling and market exchange. In order to settle 
the pastoral Fulani people and underpin the fiscal basis of the state, a network of 
agricultural plantations was established. The Sokoto caliphate was eventually 
swallowed up by colonial Nigeria, but it had amassed sufficient power to inspire 
Frederick Lugard in formulating his famous principle of indirect rule (Lugard 1922). 
The most obvious aberration of the aforementioned pattern, however, was Ethiopia. 
This country was ruled by the Solomonic dynasty for seven centuries in a row, until 
the military coup of 1974 deposed its last emperor, Haile Selassie. Interestingly, the 
ox-drawn plough had been used in this region for millennia and the Abyssinians had 
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also developed their own scripture for recording state affairs (McCann 1995). 
And yes, European powers tried, but never succeeded, to colonize Ethiopia.
The bottom-line, however, is that a process of strenuous interstate competition, 
which had spurred the build-up of fiscal and military capacity in early modern 
Europe, remained largely absent in Sub-Saharan Africa (Jones 1981). Nor did there 
emerge an African version of the Chinese state. The physical support structures of 
African states were too porous. The recent war in Mali has demonstrated that even 
for modern African states it can be very difficult to control vast empty hinterlands. 
After all, where did these insurgents come from and where did they go? 
Furthermore, the lack of well-defined rules of land tenure resulted in increasing 
conflicts with the rapid closing of the land frontier in the 20th century. Multiple 
overlapping claims to land complicated the investments needed to intensify 
production (Berry 1993, Goldstein and Udry 2008). Hence, at the time the green 
revolution conquered Asia, African states faced problems of a more fundamental 
nature, problems that were difficult to resolve quickly, and especially so without 
stable institutions of conflict resolution at the central political level. 
Relative prices
That early independent African states were weak, does not mean that its leaders 
neglected food crop agriculture. Food self-sufficiency aligned very well with anti-
colonial ideologies emphasising Africa’s newly won political and economic 
independence. In Tanzania a comprehensive program of rural development was 
implemented, which ran aground due to an overdose of ill-directed state 
intervention, not because of neglect. In Zimbabwe, Kenya and Nigeria, groups of 
well-connected large farmers were able to articulate their demands to the central 
government and successfully adopted high-yielding varieties of maize. In many 
other countries productivity gains were also recorded in the smallholder sector 
during the 1960s and 1970s, but most of these were not sustained. 
Let me discuss one more factor that highlights the added value of a global historical 
perspective: the green revolution itself! Similar to how former European and 
present-day Asian textile manufactures have hampered the development of local 
textile industries in Africa, the increasing supply of food grains, and especially rice, 
flooding the world market in the wake of the green revolution supressed the profit-
margins of African farmers. In the second half of the 20th century world trade in 
agricultural products grew at an annual rate of 3.2 percent (Federico 2005, 29), while 
real food prices dropped by 10 to 15 percent between the 1967 and 1992 (Mundlak 
and Larson 1992, Mundlak, Larson and Grego 1997; see also Federico 2005, 24). This 
effect was further compounded by the structural overvaluation of African currencies 
16 | Prof. dr Ewout Frankema   Africa and the Green Revolution  
(Harrison 1987, 55). Of course, cheap food imports were beneficial for the rapidly 
increasing number of urban poor. But they also relieved the pressure on African 
governments to endure their agrarian development programs under difficult 
circumstances. The food price hikes of recent years (see figure 5), which led to food 
riots in for instance Mozambique, not to mention the Arab world, are a wake-up 
call that the era of cheap food may have come to an end. Despite the negative 
consequences in the short run, a higher equilibrium price for food may turn out to 
be a blessing in disguise for African food producers in the long run. 
Figure 5. FAO Food Price Index, 1990-2013. Source: FAOSTAT 20139.
Will this time be different?
At the celebration of the 95th anniversary of Wageningen University in March of this 
year, our Rector Magnificus, Martin Kropff, has pointed to an acceleration in the 
diffusion of modern agricultural technology and a structural break in rice yields 
in Africa10. A survey of aggregate production statistics indeed reveals strong 
productivity growth in some African countries. Rice yields in Benin started to grow 
in the early 1990s and quickened the pace after 2007, reaching a level that exceeds 4 
tonnes per hectare at present. In Rwanda there has been a break in the long-run 
9    The FAO has constructed the real food price index by deflating its basket of nominal food prices by 
the World Bank Manufactures Unit Value Index. See: www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/
foodpricesindex/en/
10  Speech delivered by Martin Kropff at the symposium preceding the official celebration of the 95th 
Dies Natalis of Wageningen University, 15 March 2013.
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pattern from the turn of the century onwards, with yields exceeding 5 tonnes per 
hectare today. Similar upshots have been recorded in cassava yields in Malawi, 
following the introduction of a new variety around the turn of the century (Holmén 
2005, 78-9). Moreover, at the micro-level there are many more examples of rapid 
change (Reij and Smaling 2008, Haggblade and Hazell 2010, Larson and Otsuka 
2012b), which may eventually show up in the aggregate statistics as well. But we 
have seen such movements before, and most of these were not sustained. What 
reasons do we have to believe that this time is different? In concluding this lecture I 
will discuss a number of current developments that represent a clear break with 
history. 
Figure 6. Rice yields (paddy) in Benin and Rwanda, tonnes per hectare, 1961-2011. 
Source: FAOSTAT 2013.
First, Africa is currently experiencing nothing short of a transportation and 
communication revolution. As I have argued, throughout African history physical 
distances have hampered the commercialization of agriculture and the formation 
of central states. Colonial investments in railways and harbours connected local 
economic enclaves to European markets, but today’s investments in road infra-
structure, transport equipment, electricity and ICT infrastructure allow for a much 
more fine-grained process of domestic market integration. To illustrate this, in 1990, 
only 1 percent of Africans had a subscription to a mobile or fixed telephone 
connection. Today nearly every African adult has one (African Development 
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Indicators 2012). New communication technologies offer real time market infor-
mation to farmers at very low costs. They enable instant financial transactions and 
facilitate new forms of credit, saving and insurance. The tyranny of distance in 
Africa dissolves as we speak.
Second, current rates of population growth and urbanization are widely regarded as 
one of Africa’s biggest problems today. Some fifty years ago similar concerns were 
raised about Asian population growth. However, if we take serious the argument 
that low population densities and high population mobility have impaired the 
development of sedentary agriculture and the growth of urban centres, Africa’s 
current demographic transition is bound to change the parameters of agrarian 
production. Growing urban demand in combination with higher food prices, makes 
investing in local food production systems much more attractive than it was even
a decade ago11. The problem with African demography is not the growth of the 
population itself, nor its growing concentration. It’s the speed of it that puts pressure 
on the adaptive capacity of African societies.
Third, the current macro-economic outlook is far better than in the last quarter of the 
20th century. There is controlled inflation and exchange rates are more in balance 
with the economy. Notwithstanding the aforementioned diversity, the majority of 
African economies grows at rates of 3 to 6 percent per year despite the severe 
financial and economic crisis in the industrialized world (IMF 2012). This is an 
important observation. In previous periods of global economic crisis, for instance 
during the Great Depression of the 1930s or the oil crises of the 1970s, African 
economies immediately experienced the setbacks. But not today. Average levels of 
government debt in Africa hover around 40% of GDP, half the rate of Dutch 
government debt, not to mention Southern European levels (IMF 2012).
Fourth and finally, I would argue that the rapid transitions in African settlement 
patterns and the open access to worldwide media and useful knowledge is bound to 
change the rules of the political game. Of course, the formation of social identities, 
personal loyalties and political machinations has always been in flux, but the current 
rise of African urban culture goes against a long historical tendency of ethnic and 
social fractionalization. Moreover, with the pressure building up, African politicians 
face increasing incentives to concern themselves with the lot of the urban ánd the 
rural poor, whether they are democratically elected or not.
11  I have deliberately refrained from the discussion whether such investments should be channelled to 
smallholders or large-scale farmers. I believe this issue depends very much on local conditions and 
history suggests that bi-modal production systems 
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Having said this, I don’t believe that we will see a repetition of the Asian green 
revolution in Africa. The variety in Africa’s ecological conditions and historical 
development trajectories is too large. I am far more optimistic about West African 
coastal countries such as Ghana, Senegal and Benin, with a comparatively strong 
historical record of commercialization. I am less optimistic about landlocked countries 
in the interior such as Niger, Chad, or the Central African Republic. In addition, I 
believe that the more compact African countries with a historical legacy of agrarian 
intensification, such as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda are in a more favourable 
position than the giant colonial constructs such as the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
If anything, the effects of climate change are likely to deepen intra-African disparities 
and enhance intra-African migration. In other words, it would not surprise me if the 
Great Divergence that has happened at the global scale in the past five centuries, will 
be repeated within Sub-Saharan Africa in the 21st century. 
Word of thanks
I would like to say a few words of thanks. First of all, I thank the Board of 
Wageningen University and, in particular, the Rector Magnificus, Martin Kropff,
and the Director of the Social Sciences Group, Laan van Staalduinen, for granting
me their confidence. I would also like to acknowledge the special efforts made by 
Arthur Mol and Gert Spaargaren in preserving the history chair for Wageningen.
Some 15 years ago I enrolled in a business history course at the University of 
Groningen thaught by Professor Pim Kooij. Since our first encounter, we have met
at various occasions in Groningen and elsewhere, for instance at meetings of the 
Posthumus Institute. The oddest encounter we had was at the Groningen train 
station in January 2001, where Pim helped me get rid of a bunch of flowers just 
before I was to jump on my bike to India. I guess neither of us could have imagined 
that our paths would cross in Wageningen as well, but life is full of surprises. Pim,
I appreciate your unconditional support and I hope that you and your wife Anje 
enjoy this day as much as I do.
I am proud that the Rural and Environmental History group has been strengthened 
by so many bright and energetic people in the past year. Especially the coming over 
of Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk, and her VIDI-project on female and child labour
in the Dutch Empire, has been of great added value to the professional and social 
development of our group. I am also very pleased that another excellent scholar,
Piet van Cruyningen, has recently joined us. Maarit Junnikkala, Carry Vleeming and 
Margaret van Wissen have done a great job in making the expansion of our group 
possible. I am delighted that you are all here and I am very much looking forward to 
working with you in the coming years.
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I want to use this occasion to thank Anton Schuurman in particular, for the 
tremendous effort he has made in the past couple of years as the deputy chair of our 
group. Anton has carried the full load of administration, management, teaching, 
research and supervision and it kept him occupied, as we can see, even during his 
holidays. It’s fair to say, Anton, that without your sacrifices this pulpit would have 
remained vacant today. 
During the past five years I had the privilege to be part of the extremely creative and 
stimulating community of social and economic historians at Utrecht University. I am 
indebted to Oscar Gelderblom and Tine de Moor for their support of my grant 
applications. Whenever my impatience with university bureaucracy required a 
diplomatic massage, Maarten Prak and Bas van Bavel, gave up their Sunday 
afternoons. With their unique personalities and distinct senses of humour, they have 
made me feel at home in Utrecht. Jessica Dijkman and Auke Rijpma have been 
fantastic roommates. I also got to know various excellent students. In particular the 
cooperation with Marlous van Waijenburg and Michiel de Haas has been highly 
stimulating and exciting. More than anyone else though, I am indebted to Jan Luiten 
van Zanden, one of the world’s leading economic historians. The sheer scope of his 
research agenda has been a continuous source of inspiration for me and his personal 
guidance has been of pivotal importance to my academic career. Indeed, moving to 
Utrecht has been one of the best decisions in my life.
My time in Groningen has been enriched by many wonderful people as well. Jeroen 
Bartels encouraged me to develop my teaching skills in philosophy. Richard Paping 
introduced me to the archives in the province of Groningen. Thomas Lindblad 
offered me the opportunity to conduct research in Indonesia. With Jutta Bolt I 
discovered the magnificent city of Kiel. Alan Taylor hosted me during my stay at UC 
Davis. But above all, I want to thank Bart van Ark and Jan Pieter Smits, promoter and 
co-promoter of my PhD thesis. Their handwritings remain visible in all the work I 
produce. 
My parents have granted me a rather unusual amount of freedom to discover the 
world in my own way. I am grateful for your support during this journey and the 
way in which you have nourished my intellectual curiosity and encouraged me to 
make the most out of my studies. I also want to thank my parents-in-law for their 
support, and especially, the help you have offered us during the past five years
with solving the many logistic puzzles at home.
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I didn’t touch upon the best decision in my life yet, but it wasn’t really a decision. 
Arjanne, for your love and dedication you deserve flowers every day, but I rarely if 
ever bring you flowers. Even when I bring home myself, I am often not fully there. 
But I hope you find some compensation in our strong shared conviction that we are 
blessed with an extremely rich and fortunate life. A life worth living together. 
I thank you all for your attention.
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‘Major historical civilisations emerged because they managed to 
harness the forces of nature and create the agricultural surpluses 
needed to feed armies, cities and treasuries. The recent Asian 
renaissance is rooted in a veritable ‘Green Revolution’. Will Africa 
be able to sustain its current growth revival? Much will depend on 
whether African societies can keep agricultural production in line 
with human reproduction. A global historical perspective helps to 
assess the preconditions for accommodating this challenge.’
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